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WHY BUBBLE-BURSTING IS UNPREDICTABLE: WELFARE EFFECTS OF 
ANTI-BUBBLE POLICY WHEN CENTRAL BANKS MAKE MISTAKES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of bubble-bursting policy in the case where the 
central bank sometimes tries to deflate an asset which is not, in fact, overpriced. We 
consider the case of a “semi-bubble,” where some traders know that an asset is 
overpriced, but others do not. Unlike most previous papers on bubble policy, our 
framework assumes rational traders. We also assume a finite time horizon, to rule out 
infinite horizon type bubbles. The market’s “fulfilled expectations” equilibria are derived, 
and standard tools of welfare economics are applied to evaluate the effect of anti-bubble 
policy. 
 
Under the assumption that the announcements of the financial authority can help 
less informed traders to learn more about a risky asset, market equilibria are presented 
and compared. We show that, if sellers care relatively more about the states where the 
central bank makes a negative bubble-bursting announcement, an announcement policy 
interferes with the asset’s ability to share risks. Conversely, if sellers care relatively less 
about the announcement states, an announcement policy improves risk sharing. 
 
“Information leakage” plays an important role in our analysis. Because of this 
leakage, central bank announcements can initiate further information revelation between 
traders. That is, the leakage effect can reveal information that the central bank, itself, 
does not have. However, this information leakage may not be welfare improving. Also, 
this leakage effect makes it difficult to predict the effects of bubble-bursting policy. This 
may complicate both private investment strategies and public policy analysis.   
1    Introduction 
The theory of asset price bubbles has attracted a great deal of attention recently, 
due to the dramatic rise and bursting of asset prices in the late 1990s (Higgins and Osler 
1997, Shiller 2005, Ofek and Richardson 2003) and real estate fluctuations (Case and 
Shiller 2003, McCarthy and Peach 2004). These fluctuations are of interest since, if they 
are due to bubbles, they may lead to a non-optimal allocation of resources in the economy. 
Thus, the possibility that movements in asset prices could be due to “self-fulfilling 
prophesies” instead of fundamentals puts traditional economic thinking in an awkward 
situation. As Stiglitz (1990) points out, “if asset prices do not reflect fundamentals well, 
and if these skewed asset prices have an important effect on resource allocations, then the 
confidence of economists in the efficiency of market allocations of investment resources 
is, to say the least, weakened.” 
Since bubbles can distort resource allocations, it is important to determine how 
monetary authorities should deal with any bubbles in the market (Bernanke and Gertler 
1999, 2001, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani 2000, Cecchetti, Genberg and 
Wadhwani 2002, Bordo and Jeanne 2002). Economists’ arguments generally concentrate 
on three aspects of anti-bubble policy. First, can anti-bubble policy actually deflate 
bubbles? Second, if it does, to what degree can this policy correct the misallocation of 
resources in the economy, that is, increase social welfare? Third, why is it that historical 
attempts to burst bubbles have had such unpredictable, and at times disastrous, results? 
This study addresses these questions in an environment where the monetary authority 
may have mistaken information about the economy.  
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In this paper, we use an explicit, fully endogenous model of a greater-fool “semi-
bubble,” with rational agents and finite horizons, to evaluate the effects of anti-bubble 
policy when the central bank has only limited information about the true state of the 
economy, and sometimes tries to burst a bubble when there is no bubble actually present.   
We consider a model with several states of the world and two periods. Two 
representative traders, Bob (the buyer) and Susan (the seller), trade a risky asset in a 
perfectly competitive market. Initially, Susan is endowed with one unit of the risky asset 
in each of the possible states. The actual value of the asset will be revealed to traders in 
the second period. Traders have different initial information partitions and different 
marginal utilities of wealth in each state. These generate different willingnesses to pay, 
i.e., shadow prices, in each cell of each trader’s information partition.1  
Initially, in the absence of any intervention from the central bank, the market has 
an asset bubble problem. We specifically choose parameter values so that Bob’s 
willingness to pay is greater than Susan’s in all cells of their partitions. Bob will then bid 
up the asset price to his willingness to pay, and always buys from Susan.  If, in some 
states, Susan knows the asset that she is selling is worthless, then Susan is a “bad seller.” 
If Susan knows the asset that she is selling is potentially valuable, then Susan is a “good 
seller.” Because good Susan pools together with bad Susan, Bob must risk buying from 
bad Susan, if he wants to buy from good Susan. These bad-Susan states are then the 
bubble states. We call this a “semi-bubble” because only one side of the market knows 
the asset is overpriced.  
                                                 
1 We adapt the information modeling framework used in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Allen, Morris and 
Postlewaite (1993). Samuelson (2004) provides an extensive description of this modeling methodology.  
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Next, in addition to the two traders, assume there is a central bank with imperfect 
information about the states of the world. The central bank’s information partition is 
different from the two traders’ information partitions. Revelation of the central bank’s 
information will further refine traders’ information, and thus change their shadow price 
relationships.  
To restrain the “bubble” problem, the central bank may make a negative 
announcement when it believes the asset is in a bubble, while it makes no announcement 
when it believes the asset is valuable. We call this an “announcement policy.” If the 
central bank chooses never to make any announcement (similar to the initial situation 
where there is no central bank), we call this a “no-announcement policy.”  
Of course, since the central bank’s bubble-bursting announcement is sometimes 
mistaken, agents will rationally discount any announcement to some degree. The major 
goals of this study are to determine the effects of an announcement policy, and to find 
conditions, if any, under which an announcement policy can improve social welfare.  
Assume, then, that the central bank follows an announcement policy. After the 
central bank makes the anti-bubble announcement, both traders will refine their 
information partitions and have new shadow prices. This change in shadow price 
relationships may cause the new market prices to reveal more information to traders than 
does the initial announcement. We call this process “information leakage.”  
For example, recall that, in the no-announcement-policy situation, we assume that 
Bob will always buy from Susan, and Bob’s willingness to pay is the market price. Then, 
in an announcement-policy situation, good Susan’s shadow price may rise above Bob’s 
after the anti-bubble announcement. Good Susan’s willingness to pay will then become 
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the market price in the corresponding announcement states. When Bob observes the 
market price rising above his own willingness to pay, he will conclude that he is dealing 
with good Susan, who has a non-zero willingness to pay. On the other hand, if Bob 
observes the market price remain unchanged at his own willingness to pay after an 
announcement, he will conclude that he is dealing with a bad Susan, and his willingness 
to pay in this state will drop to zero.  These changing shadow price relationships can 
therefore cause some of Susan’s private information to “leak” to Bob.  
We concentrate on three cases, each allowing for the ex ante existence of a bubble.  
? Case 1. In this case, Bob’s shadow prices always remain larger than Susan’s 
after an anti-bubble announcement, so no further information is revealed. Bob 
continues to buy in each state of the world, which makes the anti-bubble 
effort of the central bank in vain in the sense that it does not burst the asset 
bubble. But asset prices in announcement states may be lower than in no-
announcement states. Consequently, asset prices in the bubble states may be 
lower than the prices without an anti-bubble announcement. 
? Case 2a. In this case, owing to the post-announcement changes in shadow 
price relationships, further information is revealed to Bob. This is a “leakage” 
case. With more information, Bob can refine his information partition to be 
the same as Susan’s, and is able to distinguish bad Susan from good Susan. 
That is, in certain announcement states the central bank warns of a bubble but 
information leakage tells Bob that he is dealing with good Susan. In Case 2a 
Bob’s willingness-to-pay increases but stays below Susan’s. Thus, Bob will 
not buy from Susan in these states and Susan’s higher willingness to pay is 
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the market price. Also, in the states where the central bank warns of a bubble 
and Bob finds out that his is dealing with bad Susan, Bob’s willingness-to-
pay drops to zero. He therefore does not buy in this situation either, so trade 
does not happen in any of the announcement states in Case 2a. Trade only 
happens in the “no-announcement” states where the central bank believes that 
the risky asset is valuable.   
? Case 2b. In this case, as in Case 2a, the anti-bubble announcement causes 
further information leakage. With additional information, Bob again refines 
his information partition to be the same as Susan’s. However, unlike Case 2a, 
after Bob learns that Susan is good, he will buy from her because his 
willingness to pay rises above good Susan’s in the announcement states. Bob 
will not buy from bad Susan because he knows the asset in that situation to be 
worthless. Bob continues to buy from Susan in the “no-announcement” states. 
In Case 2b, Bob avoids trade with bad Susan and only trades with good Susan.  
In addition to these three cases, there are three parallel cases, Case 3, 4a and 4b, 
where Bob does not buy from Susan in the no-announcement states. However, in this 
paper we focus on Cases 1, 2a and 2b, for brevity.  
For each of these cases, we derive the welfare effects of the announcement policy. 
In Case 1, we prove that, when Susan puts less weight than does Bob on the states where 
the central bank makes a “bubble bursting” announcement, it is possible for the anti-
bubble announcement to improve social welfare. In Cases 2a and 2b, where the policy 
leads to additional information leakage in these cases, we identify endogenously 
generated factors that make it more or less difficult to improve social welfare.  
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We can view these results in terms of policy’s effect on an asset’s risk-sharing 
attributes, as in Hirshleifer (1971). If Susan puts more weight on the announcement states 
than on the no-announcement states, an announcement policy from the central bank 
reduces the asset’s ability to share risk. Here, Susan bears more risk than she otherwise 
would because she gets less in the announcement states, which she weighs more, and gets 
more in the no-announcement states, which she weighs less, so her welfare is reduced as 
a result of the announcement. Conversely, if Susan cares more about the no-
announcement states than about the announcement states, then an announcement policy 
from the central bank improves the asset’s ability to share risk. Bob, on the other hand, 
acts like a risk neutral market maker. His expected welfare is unchanged in our model.   
Information leakage plays an important role in our analysis. Because of this 
leakage, central bank announcements can initiate further information revelation between 
traders. In general, one would expect this additional information revelation to improve 
social welfare. However, we will show that this additional information revelation can 
reduce welfare, depending on its effect on the asset’s ability to share risk. Also, the 
leakage effect is unpredictable. This significantly complicates both public policy and the 
efforts of private investors to anticipate the price effects of this policy. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 compares our bubble 
framework to others in the literature. Section 3 develops market equilibria under the 
announcement policy versus the no-announcement policy. Section 4 presents the welfare 
analysis and our propositions, and Section 5 concludes.  
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2    Previous Literature 
In his famous “beauty contest” analogy, Keynes (1936) describes an equity 
market as an environment in which speculators anticipate “what average opinion expects 
average opinion to be” rather than trying to find the underlying fundamentals of an asset. 
Since Keynes, many bubble models have been presented in the literature. Standard 
models of rational bubbles use an infinite-horizon framework, where agents buy 
overpriced assets because they believe those assets’ prices will inflate forever (Tirole 
1985). However, in these models, bubbles actually tend to improve welfare, since the 
bubble assets facilitate saving for future consumption. It seems unlikely that actual 
historical bubbles serve this function. Also, as argued by Kent and Lowe (1997), “the size 
of the bubble is indeterminate” in these models, so “there is no way of tying down the 
size” of any response of bubbles to policy actions.  
For these reasons, previous studies of anti-bubble policy normally assume 
exogenously generated bubbles for risky assets. However, this method of modeling 
bubbles makes it difficult to relate the welfare effects of bubble policy to the underlying 
market failures which generate the bubble, because these market failures are not 
explicitly derived. Few previous studies therefore examine the welfare implications of 
anti-bubble policies. 
Allen et al. (1993) provide a different approach to bubble research by modeling 
bubbles in a finite-horizon framework with rational agents. In their model any bubble 
must burst eventually. They use asymmetric information and short-sales constraints to 
model a “strong bubble,” where everyone knows that the asset is overpriced. However, as 
a result of the information asymmetry, no one knows whether anyone else also knows 
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that the asset is overpriced, so agents hope to sell their assets to the next “greater fool” 
before prices collapse. Their paper proves that bubbles are possible even if everyone is 
rational and knows that the overpriced asset will soon collapse.   
Allen et al. (1993) present a very interesting approach to modeling asset bubbles. 
However, in its original form their model is too complicated to work with. Conlon (2004) 
simplified the Allen et al. approach by reducing the required number of agents from three 
to two. This simplification makes the comparison of equilibria easier. The present study 
simplifies further by focusing on a “semi-bubble,” where only the seller knows that the 
asset is overpirced.  
Other theoretical papers also model the intuition of “greater fool” bubbles from 
different perspectives. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) show that synchronization risk 
can prevent arbitrageurs from taking short positions to correct mispricing. A stock bubble 
grows until a significant number of arbitrageurs attack together. As a result, when 
arbitrageurs conclude that large scale synchronization is not likely, they will choose to 
“ride” the bubble for the time being. Similarly, in de Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990), rational arbitrageurs make profits by exploiting “positive feedback 
traders.” When good news is confirmed, arbitrageurs buy into an asset and inflate its 
price. They then expect to sell the equity to the positive feedback traders in the next 
period since they know the positive feedback traders will follow the good news and drive 
prices up even more.  
Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) model bubbles as a 
result of overconfidence. In their models, heterogeneous beliefs arise because of the 
existence of overconfident traders. Asset owners have the option to sell the asset to other 
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traders with more optimistic priors. Traders trade at a price higher than their valuation of 
expected dividends because they believe that they will be able to find more optimistic 
buyers willing to pay even higher prices. The overconfidence framework enables 
researchers to characterize properties of asset bubbles, such as trading frequency and 
asset price volatility. In particular, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that their model 
is consistent with the characteristics of actual historical bubbles. They also suggest that a 
small trading tax could reduce speculative trading, but not overpricing.     
Greater-fool type bubbles may not just be a theoretical possibility. Recent 
empirical studies also provide some support for the theory. For example, citing the 
theoretical framework of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Temin and Voth (2004) show 
that during the South Sea bubble, Hoare’s Bank, a leading player in the event, knew that 
a bubble was in progress and “nonetheless invested in the stock: it was profitable to ride 
the bubble.” They also show that its informational advantage did not prevent Hoare’s 
Bank from inflating the bubble. Thus, informed investor behavior does not necessarily 
lead to attacks on a bubble. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) provide more recent 
evidence of investors riding a bubble. They investigate the activities of hedge funds 
during the growth of the “dot-com bubble.” They find that hedge funds, which are 
normally considered to represent “rational arbitrageurs,” did not correct the price 
misalignments in the market. In their sample period, hedge fund portfolios were deeply 
long in high-tech stocks. Further, hedge fund managers were able to predict the price 
peak of individual stocks and reduced their positions before prices collapsed. 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show that hedge fund portfolios earned excess returns of 
about 4.5 percent per quarter compared with well-matched portfolios.  
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Many researches have addressed the issue of asset bubbles and monetary policy. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and (2001) argue that unstable asset prices should not be the 
central bank’s major concern unless these price movements influence the central bank’s 
expectation of inflation. That is, central banks should not respond to asset price 
fluctuations in general. They argue that an inflation-targeting monetary policy will 
stabilize the economy well, even during an asset market boom or collapse.  
Several other studies are more positive about central bank policies towards asset 
price misalignments. Cecchetti et al. (2002) and Kent and Lowe (1997) present their 
arguments in an inflation-targeting framework. Cecchetti et al. (2002) argue that the 
central bank can improve macroeconomic stability by reacting differently towards 
different types of asset price misalignments. Kent and Lowe (1997) suggest that an anti-
bubble reaction from the central bank today helps it to realize long-term inflation targets 
by reducing future asset price instabilities.  
Bordo and Jeanne (2002) discuss the difference between a proactive monetary 
policy and a reactive monetary policy. They suggest that, in some circumstances, a 
reactive strategy by a central bank, focusing only on deviations from inflation targets, 
may lead to more loss of output than a proactive policy which incorporates asset prices 
into the central bank’s monetary objectives. However, they also suggest that such an 
optimal monetary policy cannot be generalized into a simple policy rule since it depends 
on the economic variables in a “complex, non-linear” way.  
Conlon (2005), finally, uses a “greater fool” bubble model to evaluate the effect 
of anti-bubble policy. However, unlike our analysis, he assumes that the central bank 
only tries to deflate prices when assets are, in fact, overpriced. Conlon shows that central 
 10
bank announcements which are accurate in this sense can improve social welfare, if they 
reduce the lemons problem (Akerlof 1970) caused by bad sellers who know their assets 
are overpriced. However, he also shows that bubble bursting can actually make the 
lemons problem worse.  
 
 
3    Model and Market Equilibria  
In this section, we analyze anti-bubble policy in a revised version of the Allen et 
al. (1993) type greater fool model. For simplicity, we use the Conlon (2004) two-agent 
version of the model, and simplify further by considering a “semi-bubble” model. That is, 
in period one, only half of the agents know that the asset is overpriced. In addition, a 
central bank may make an announcement about what it believes to be the true state of the 
market. Traders will then refine their knowledge about the market based on the 
announcement. Like other agents in the market, the central bank possesses only partly 
correct knowledge about the true state. As is standard, we assume a short-selling 
constraint in this model.2
We adopt the “fulfilled expectations” equilibrium notion of Kreps (1977) to 
analyze equilibrium in the market. Different traders have different information partitions 
and marginal utilities. Traders thus have different shadow prices in different states of the 
                                                 
2 Many studies have investigated empirically different types of short-sales constraints and their effects. For 
example, Ofek and Richardson (2003) discuss the role of short-sales constraints in the DotCom bubble. 
They argue that there were substantial short-sales restrictions due to stock lock-up agreements among late 
90s hi-tech stocks. D'Avolio (2002) analyzes the security lending market and shows that the supply of 
loanable stocks can be very scarce, which causes a significant short-sales constraint. Alexander and 
Peterson (1999) and Alexander and Peterson (2007) investigate the role of short-sales regulations, e.g., the 
price test (or “up-tick rule), in constraining short sales. Lamont (2004) discusses legal and short-squeeze 
pressures from short sales targeted firms, which increase short-sales costs for short sellers and yield another 
source of short-sales constraints.  
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world. Also, we assume that their elasticities of demand are infinite at these shadow 
prices. With short-sales constraints, the actual market price in each state is then bid up to 
the highest of the traders’ shadow prices in that state.  
In our model, there is a risky asset, whose market is competitive, with two 
representative traders, Susan (the seller) and Bob (the buyer), and a central bank. There 
are five states and two time periods. The discount factor is one. There is uncertainty in 
the first period, but the true state of the world is revealed in the second period. 
The state space Ω is: 
Ω = { , , , ,  }. Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Here  is the state where Susan is “bad” and knows that the asset is worthless, and , 
 and  are the states where the central bank believes that Susan could be bad and 
makes an anti-bubble announcement. In the states  and  the central bank believes 
that Susan is good and makes no announcement. Therefore subscript n means “no 
announcement” from the central bank, and subscript a  means “announcement.” Assume 
that all five states are equally likely, so each state has a probability of one-fifth. The risky 
asset only pays a dividend, of 10, in two states, , . Subscript 2 means “dividend of 
ten pays in the second period, subscript 1 means “no dividend will be paid in both 
periods.” The traders’ initial information partitions are: 
Be Be
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
2
G
ae 2
G
ne
PS = { }, { , , , } Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
PB = { , , , , } Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
That is, Susan knows whether or not the true state is , but Bob has no information 
about which state has occurred. The central bank’s information partition is: 
Be
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PCB = { , , }, { , } Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Thus, if the state is , say, then the central bank knows the state is either or , but 
it does not know which one it is.  
1
G
ne 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Suppose that Susan initially owns one unit of the risky asset in all five states. This 
risky asset only pays a dividend, of 10, in two states,  and . Because of her initial 
information partition, if the true state of the world is , Susan is a “bad seller” since she 
knows that the asset she is planning to sell actually is worthless. If the true state of the 
world is any one of , , , or , Susan is a “good seller,” as indicated by the 
superscript G, since she believes that the asset has a positive expected value. Bob, on the 
other hand, cannot distinguish between the different states of the world. Bob can be seen 
as an uninformed trader in the asset market, since he depends on public information.  
2
G
ae 2
G
ne
Be
1
G
ne 1
G
ae 2
G
ne 2
G
ae
Marginal utilities of wealth for Susan and Bob are given in the following table: 
Table 1: Marginal Utilities  
State Be  1
G
ae  2
G
ae  1
G
ne  2
G
ne  
EMU  By  1ay  2ay  1ny  2ny  
FMU  Bz  1az  2az  1nz  2nz  
 
Like the traders, the central bank has only limited information about the true state of the 
world. In states , , , the central bank knows that Susan could be a bad seller. 
Therefore, if it is following an announcement policy, it will make a “bubble-bursting” 
announcement. In states and , the central bank knows that Susan is a good seller, so  
it will not make a bubble-bursting announcement in these two states.  
Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
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3.1    The Central Bank with a No-Announcement Policy  
First, let us consider the market equilibria when the central bank does not reveal 
its information to the market, so the central bank is practicing a no-announcement policy. 
The shadow prices for Susan and Bob in period one can be calculated by taking marginal-
utility-weighted values of the dividends, for each cell in their partitions. These shadow 
prices are given in Table 2, with  and given by: EIsp
F
Isp
S
Isp =
2 2
1 1 2 2
10( )a n
n a a n
y y
y y y y
+
+ + +
B
Isp, =
2 2
1 1 2 2
10( )a n
B n a a
z z
nz z z z z
+
+ + + +                 (1) 
Table 2: Shadow Prices in Case I (with no-announcement policy) 
 Be  1
G
ae  2
G
ae  1
G
ne  2
G
ne  
Susan 0 S
Isp  
S
Isp  
S
Isp  
S
Isp  
Bob B
Isp  
B
Isp  
B
Isp  
B
Isp  
B
Isp  
 
With these shadow prices, we obtain the following market equilibria. 
Case I: If , then there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, trade will 
happen in all five states at the price . Bob will be hurt eventually if the true state of 
the world is , , or . However, a semi-bubble exists only in state  because Bob 
pays for a worthless asset which Susan knows is worthless.  
B
Isp ≥ SIsp
B
Isp
Be 1
G
ae 1
G
ne
Be
There is also a second, non-bubble equilibrium, with price equal to zero in state 
, and price equal to in the other four states, (with the formula of  given in Case 
II below). Intuitively, this is possible because bad Susan is more eager to sell than good 
Susan, which may lead to different selling efforts by bad Susan and good Susan, and leak 
Be BIIsp
B
IIsp
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further information to the other side of the trade. Suppose Susan tries harder to sell the 
asset if the true state is (because she knows the asset really is worthless). Bob knows 
the information partition of Susan, so he might conclude that the true state of the world is 
. In this case, the market price drops to zero in state ,  yielding the second market 
equilibrium. However, since we are interested in bubble-bursting announcements, we 
focus on the first equilibrium, which has a semi-bubble in state .  
Be
Be Be
Be
Also, because an asset bubble exists only in Case I, we will be concentrating on 
this case in the welfare analysis in Section 4. However, we also derive the market 
equilibria in the other two cases, Case II.1 and Case II.2 below, to complete the analysis 
of the no-announcement policy situation.  
Case II: If < , then good Susan will tend to bid the market price up to her 
shadow price, so will be the market price in states , , , and . However, 
since Susan’s shadow price in state is zero, Susan will not bid price above  in state 
. Bob would then observe this price difference and learn that the true state of the world 
is . That is, Susan’s information will be revealed to Bob through the market price (this 
is similar to the information leakage effect we will discuss in Subsection 3.2 below). The 
shadow prices for both types of trader will then be as in Table 3, with: 
B
Isp
S
Isp
S
Isp 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Be BIsp
Be
Be
S
IIsp = , =
S
Isp
B
IIsp
2 2
1 1 2 2
10( )a n
n a a
z z
nz z z z
+
+ + + .                               (2) 
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Table 3: Shadow Prices in Case II 
 Be  1
G
ae  2
G
ae  1
G
ne  2
G
ne  
Susan 0 S
IIsp  
S
IIsp  
S
IIsp  
S
IIsp  
Bob 0 B
IIsp  
B
IIsp  
B
IIsp  
B
IIsp  
Case II leads to two sub-cases. 
Case II.1: In this case, even after the bubble state  is revealed to Bob, Bob’s 
confidence in the market improves only a little. Thus, Bob won’t buy even when the true 
state is not the bubble state . Intuitively, the fear of getting a worthless asset in state  
does not concern Bob very much, so the information revealed, that he is not in the bubble 
state, has little positive influence on Bob’s shadow price. This happens if Bob’s marginal 
utility of consumption in state  is very small. Therefore his new shadow price, , is 
roughly the same as  and, so, will still be smaller than . Thus  will still be the 
market price in states , , , and . There will be no trade in these states. Also, no 
bubble exists in state , since the price is zero at .  
Be
Be Be
Be BIIsp
B
Isp
S
Isp
S
Isp
1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Be Be
Case II.2: In this case, after Bob learns that he is not in the bubble state , his 
confidence in the market improves significantly. Here, the fear of getting a worthless 
asset in state  concerns Bob greatly. So, when Bob learns that the state is not , 
Bob’s shadow price in other states rises above Susan’s. This case happens when Bob’s 
marginal utility of consumption in state  is very large, so  rises a great deal above 
.  Thus, even though < ,  becomes larger than , since . 
Trade will then happen in states , , , and  at price .  
Be
Be Be
Be BIIsp
B
Isp
B
Isp
S
Isp
B
IIsp
S
Isp
B
IIsp ? BIsp
1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
B
IIsp
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3.2 The Central Bank with An Announcement Policy 
If the central bank reveals its information, Susan’s and Bob’s partitions become 
PS = { }, { , },{ , } Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
PB = { , , }, { , } Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Here Susan forms PS by incorporating new information from the central bank’s 
announcement about whether or not states , , or  occurred. Bob knew nothing 
before the announcement, so his information partition, P
Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae
F, after the announcement, is 
identical to the information partition of the central bank. That is, when the central bank 
makes an announcement, Bob knows that the true state is one of , , and , but he 
does not exactly know which one is the true state. On the other hand, when the central 
bank makes no announcement, Bob know that the true state is one of , , he does not 
know the exact state either.  
Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
The new shadow prices in period one are shown in Table 4: 
Table 4: Shadow Prices with Announcement Policy—Case 1 
 Be  1
G
ae  2
G
ae  1
G
ne  2
G
ne  
Susan 0 2
1 2
10 a
a a
y
y y+  
2
1 2
10 a
a a
y
y y+  
2
1 2
10 n
n n
y
y y+  
2
1 2
10 n
n n
y
y y+  
Bob 2
1 2
10 a
B a
z
az z z+ +  
2
1 2
10 a
B a
z
az z z+ +
2
1 2
10 a
B a
z
az z z+ +
2
1 2
10 n
n n
z
z z+  
2
1 2
10 n
n n
z
z z+  
 
We next consider the various possible market equilibria in the presence of an 
announcement policy. In order for the central bank’s announcement to always have a 
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negative influence on the market price, we assume that the following shadow price 
relationships hold throughout our analysis.  
For Susan:       2 1
1 2
10 a S
A
a a
y sp
y y
=+ <
2
1
1 2
10 n S
NA
n n
y sp
y y
=+ ,                           (3) 
For Bob:   2 1
1 2
10 a B
A
B a a
z sp
z z z
=+ + <
2
1
1 2
10 n B
NA
n n
z sp
z z
=+ .                            (4) 
Here the subscript A represents “announcement,” and NA represents “no announcement.” 
Case 1 (Bob’s shadow price always above Susan’s and he always buys): If 
1
S
NAsp ≤ 1
B
NAsp  and 1
S
Asp ≤ 1
B
Asp , then there is still a bubble equilibrium in which Bob always 
buys from Susan. The market prices in period 1 will be Bob’s shadow prices, i.e., 1
B
Asp  in 
states , , , where an announcement is made, and Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
B
NAsp  in the states , ,  
where no announcement is made. Trade will always occur, even in the bubble state .
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Be 3  
Case 2 (Bob’s shadow price falls below Susan’s if the central bank makes an 
announcement): If 1
S
NAsp ≤ 1
B
NAsp  but 1
S
Asp > 1
B
Asp , the anti-bubble announcement 
decreases Bob’s confidence a great deal, so his willingness-to-pay is lower than good 
Susan’s. Good Susan will tend to bid the market price up to her shadow price in the 
announcement states  and . Since Susan’s shadow price in state  is zero, bad 
Susan in the competitive market will not bid price above Bob’s shadow price, 
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
Be
1
B
Asp , in 
state . If the true state is , Bob observes that the market price does not change and 
thus identifies the state as , since he knows Susan’s information partition. Conversely, 
if Susan is good, Bob will realize that too. Bob will then have the same information 
Be Be
Be
                                                 
3 Of course, as in Subsection 3.1 above, there is also a no-bubble equilibrium. For simplicity, we focus on 
the bubble equilibrium. 
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partition as Susan. That is, the information revealed by the central bank induces 
additional “information leakage.” The market price will drop to zero in state , and rise 
to 
Be
'AP = 2 1 210 /( )a a az z z+  in states  and . Here, 1Gae 2Gae 'AP  is Bob’s shadow price after the 
central bank announcement and information leakage, so the new shadow price schedule 
will be as in Table 5. The new shadow prices lead to two sub-cases. 
Table 5: Shadow Prices with Announcement Policy—Case 2 
 Be  1
G
ae  2
G
ae  1
G
ne  2
G
ne  
Susan 0 2
1 2
10 a
a a
y
y y+  
2
1 2
10 a
a a
y
y y+  
2
1 2
10 n
n n
y
y y+  
2
1 2
10 n
n n
y
y y+  
Bob 0 'AP  'AP  2
1 2
10 n
n n
z
z z+  
2
1 2
10 n
n n
z
z z+  
 
Case 2a (No trade if the central bank makes announcement): In this sub-case, 
the anti-bubble announcement depresses Bob’s willingness-to-pay very much, and the 
information leakage does not cause his confidence to recover enough in states  and , 
so Bob does not buy after an announcement (though he always buys if the central bank 
turns out not to make an announcement). That is, Bob’s confidence does not rise much if 
he learns that he is not facing bad Susan. This happens if 
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
Bz , his marginal utility of 
consumption in the bubble state , is very small. In this case, Be 'AP  will be roughly the 
same as 1
B
Asp , so, since 1
B
Asp < 1
S
Asp , we have 'AP < 1
S
Asp  still, so Bob does not buy from 
Susan in states  and . Trade will not happen in state  either, since both traders 1
G
ae 2
G
ae
Be
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know the asset is worthless. However, trade will happen in states  and  at market 
price
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
1
B
NAsp .  
Case 2b (trade happens when Susan is good): In this sub-case, the anti-bubble 
announcement depresses Bob’s willingness-to-pay, but information leakage causes his 
confidence to recover more significantly. After the bad Susan is identified, Bob always 
buys from good Susan. Bob is more concerned about the danger of buying from bad 
Susan and, so, is greatly relieved when he learns that Susan is good. This happens when 
Bz is very large, so >'AP 1
S
Asp  since 'AP ? 1BAsp . Trade happens in states  and , and 
the market price is
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
'AP . However, the market price is zero in state  since both traders 
know it is the bubble state. Trade also happens in the no-announcement states  and , 
and the price is
Be
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
1
B
NAsp .  
Now we have enough equilibria to do the welfare analysis (Case I without the 
announcement policy, and Cases 1, 2a, and 2b with an announcement policy). But for 
completeness we derive the remaining equilibria in Cases 3, 4a, and 4b below. These are 
similar to Cases 1, 2a and 2b, but trade does not happen if the central bank turns out not 
to make an announcement.    
Case 3: If 1
S
Asp  ≤ 1
B
Asp  but 1
S
NAsp > 1
B
NAsp , the market price in states , and  
will be 
Be 1
G
ae 2
G
ae
1
B
Asp , and the market price in state and will be 1
G
ne 2
G
ne 1
S
NAsp . In states ,  and 
, trade will happen. In states and , trade will not happen. Trade happens only 
after the announcement. The semi-bubble still exists after the announcement. 
Be 1
G
ae
2
G
ae 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
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Case 4: If 1
B
Asp < 1
S
Asp  and 1
B
NAsp < 1
S
NAsp , then good Susan will always bid the 
market price up to her shadow price, so 1
S
Asp  will be the market price in states  and , 
and 
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
1
S
NAsp will be the market price in states and .  1
G
ne 2
G
ne
However, in state  Susan’s shadow price is zero, so Susan in the competitive 
market will not bid price above Bob’s shadow price 
Be
1
B
Asp  in the announcement states. 
Bob then observes the difference in market prices and learns that the true state is . That 
is, we again have “information leakage” as the result of the central bank announcement. 
Bob’s information partition will be refined, yielding the same shadow price schedule as 
in Table 5. 
Be
Case 4a: In this case, even after the bubble state is revealed to Bob, he still does 
not trade, because his confidence in states ,  changes very little. Bob is not 
concerned about the bubble state  as an important factor influencing his trading 
decision. This case happens if Bob’s marginal utility in the bubble state, , is very small, 
so his new shadow price, 
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
Be
Bz
'AP , will be roughly the same as 1
B
Asp . Since 1
B
Asp < 1
S
Asp , 'AP  
will then still be smaller than 1
S
Asp  also. In this equilibrium, the market prices are 1
S
Asp  in 
states , , and 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
S
NAsp in states , . Trade does not happen in state  because 
both traders know the asset is worthless.  
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
Be
Case 4b: In this case, after the bubble state  is revealed to Bob, his confidence 
in the other announcement states improves significantly. That is, the fear of buying from 
bad Susan concerns Bob greatly. So after Bob identifies the bubble state , his shadow 
prices in other announcement states increase a great deal and he buys in these states. This 
Be
Be
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case happens if Bz is very large, so 1
B
Asp ? 'AP , and it is possible that 1SAsp < 'AP . The 
market prices are zero in state , Be 'AP  in states , , and 1
G
ae 2
G
ae 1
S
NAsp  in states , . Trade 
will happen only in states and after the announcement. The revelation by the 
central bank increases Bob’s confidence in trading. 
1
G
ne 2
G
ne
1
G
ae 2
G
ae
 
 
4    Welfare Analysis of the Anti-Bubble Policy 
We now have several equilibria under different market situations. To examine the 
welfare effects of central bank announcements, it is first necessary to explain how we 
measure social welfare.  
In this paper, social welfare is measured by Bob’s consumer surplus and Susan’s 
producer surplus. However, Bob’s consumer surplus is zero. This is because both Susan’s 
and Bob’s marginal utilities in each state of the world both are constant, but Bob is 
different from Susan in the sense that his demand curve in this model is horizontal, i.e., 
his elasticity of demand is infinite, so his consumer surplus in this model is zero. On the 
other side, Susan can sell only her limited endowment of the asset, since she is short-sales 
constrained, so she cannot sell an infinite amount of the asset. Thus, her seller surplus, or 
producer surplus, can be non zero. Social welfare from the asset transaction is therefore 
equal to Susan’s producer surplus, i.e., her benefit from any sales of her endowed asset. 
Before we discuss the social welfare effects of anti-bubble announcements, let us 
limit the set of equilibria that we consider.  
In Section 3.1 above, the central bank never makes an announcement with respect 
to an asset bubble in the economy. Traders behave as we have analyzed in Case I, Case 
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II.1 and II.2. We will focus on Case I from Section 3.1, where there is a semi-bubble in 
the asset market, so the “no announcement” asset price, NAPP , refers to the market price 
in Case I. 
In Section 3.2 above, we considered the case where the central bank follows an 
announcement policy. It makes an announcement if it believes that there is an asset 
bubble. Here we use AP to denote the market price when the central bank believes there is 
an asset bubble and makes an announcement. Similarly, we use NAP  to denote the market 
price when the central bank is following the announcement policy, but it makes no actual 
announcement, since it believes there is no danger of an asset bubble in the market.  In 
the asset market, if traders hear an announcement, they know that the danger of an asset 
bubble is more serious, so they pay less in those states, though price does not necessarily 
fall to zero, since they know the central bank also has imperfect information.  If traders 
do not hear any announcement, they will conclude that the danger of a bubble in the 
market is less likely, so they will trade with more confidence and pay higher prices. We 
therefore always choose parameter values such that 
AP ≤ NAPP ≤ NAP .                                                        (5) 
We also adopt another assumption to simplify the analysis. In Case 1, Case 2a and 
2b, under the announcement policy, we assume that Bob continues to buy from Susan if 
the central bank turns out not to make an announcement. For brevity, we focus on these 
cases, and ignore the parallel cases, Case 3, 4a and 4b, where trade ceases when no 
announcement is made. Thus, we will compare the equilibrium in Case I with the 
equilibria in Cases 1, 2a and 2b.  
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4.1 Conditions under which Announcements Increase Social Welfare 
This section analyzes the welfare effects of an anti-bubble announcement policy. 
We start with the non-announcement policy Case I, where the central bank does not 
reveal any information, and Bob always buys from Susan, whether she is good or bad. 
That is, we require  as in Case I from Section 3.1, and compare welfare in this 
case to welfare in Cases 1, 2a and 2b from Section 3.2. Again, since Bob’s elasticity of 
demand is infinite, his consumer surplus in this model is zero, so we focus on Susan’s 
producer surplus in the welfare analysis. 
S
Isp ≤ BIsp
In Case I, the central bank is practicing a no-announcement policy. Susan’s 
expected utility from the trade is equal to the (constant) market price times her expected 
marginal utility in those states. This gives: 
2 2
1 1 2 2
10( )a n
B n a a n
z z
z z z z z
+
+ + + + ×
1 1 2 2( )
5
B n a a ny y y y y+ + + + .                       (6) 
In the three announcement-policy cases (Case 1, Case 2a and Case 2b), the central 
bank announces its information to the market, so Susan’s expected utilities can be written 
as follows. 
In Case 1, Susan always sells the asset at Frank’s shadow price, so her expected 
utility from the market is: 
2
1 2
10 a
B a a
z
z z z+ + ×
1 2
5
B ay y y a+ + + 2
1 2
10 n
n n
z × 1 2
5
ny y n+  .                     (7) 
z z+
In this case, the central bank announcement does not prevent Bob from buying from bad 
Susan. That is, The central bank announcement does not burst the semi-bubble in state . 
However, since we assume
Be
AP ≤ NAPP ≤ NAP , the announcement will in some degree 
decrease the market price in state  and also in the other two announcement states, Be
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1
G
ae and . The announcement policy makes Susan worse off in the announcement states, 
but makes her better off in the no-announcement states.   
2
G
ae
In Case 2a, Susan keeps the asset in the announcement states, including state , 
where the dividend is 10. On the other hand, she sells it in the no-announcement states at 
Bob’s shadow price. Thus, her expected utility from the market is:  
2
G
ae
10× 2
5
ay + 2
1 2
10 n
n n
z
z z+ ×
1 2
5
ny y n+ .                                        (8) 
The central bank announcement prevents Bob from buying from Susan in the 
announcement states. “Bad Susan” is worse off, and trading volume falls to zero if the 
central bank makes a bubble announcement.  
In Case 2b, Susan sells in all the non-bubble states, at Frank’s shadow price, so her 
expected utility from the market is: 
 2
1 2
10 a
a a
z
z z+ ×
1 2
5
a ay y+ + 2
1 2
10 n
n n
z
z z+ ×
1 2
5
ny y n+ .                             (9) 
The central bank announcement prevents Bob from buying the risky asset from bad 
Susan, but trade happens in all of the other four states between Bob and good Susan. The 
central bank announcement does burst the asset bubble while retaining the trading 
volume in the non-bubble states. Both Cases 2a and 2b involve information leakage, 
because bad Susan’s knowledge of state  ends up being revealed to the market.  Be
We next determine the conditions under which the anti-bubble policy increases 
social welfare, i.e., Susan’s expected utilities from the market. That is, we compare 
Susan’s expected welfare from Case I above to her expected welfare in Cases 1, 2a, and 
2b. 
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We first consider Case 1, where the anti-bubble announcement does not actually 
burst the asset bubble.  
Proposition 1: In Case 1 (where buyers buy regardless of the anti-bubble 
announcement), the announcement policy increases social welfare if and only if 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
B a a B a
n n n n
z z z y y y
z z y y
a+ + + +>+ + .                                      (10) 
Proof: Because Bob always buys in Case 1, and his welfare is unaffected by the 
anti-bubble policy, his welfare gain in the announcement states (paying less) should be 
equal to his welfare loss in the no-announcement states (paying more), i.e.,  
( NAP AP P− )( 1 2B az z z a+ + ) = ( NA NAP 1 2n nz zP P− )( + ).                    (11) 
This can also be verified by plugging in the formulas for NAPP = , BIsp AP = 1
B
Asp , and 
NAP = 1
B
NAsp . For Susan, her welfare decreases in the announcement states (receiving less) 
and increases in the no-announcement states (receiving more). When her loss is smaller 
than her gain, then her welfare (social welfare) increases. This happens when 
( NAP AP P− )( 1B a 2ay y y+ + ) < ( NA NAPP P− )( 1 2n ny y+ ).                  (12) 
Rearranging equation (11) and inequality (12) slightly gives: 
NA NAP
NAP A
P P
P P
−
− =
1 2
1 2
B a
n n
az z z
z z
+ +
+ ,                                       (13) 
NA NAP
NAP A
P P
P P
−
− >
1 2
1 2
B a
n n
y y y
y y
a+ +
+ .                                      (14) 
Combining equation (13) and inequality (14) gives Condition (10).  QED 
Proposition 1 says that, in Case 1, social welfare (i.e., Susan’s welfare) will increase 
as a result of the anti-bubble policy if Susan puts less weight on the announcement states 
relative to the no announcement states than does Bob.  
 26
This proposition can be understood as follows. We assume that AP ≤ NAPP ≤ NAP  
always holds. Thus, the announcement shifts wealth from Susan to Bob in the 
announcement states, and from Bob to Susan in the no-announcement states.  The overall 
expected change in Bob’s welfare is zero. Using this as a benchmark, we can look at the 
change in Susan’s welfare. If Susan puts relatively less weight on the announcement 
states than does Bob, she will care less about the lower AP after the announcement. On the 
other hand, if Susan puts more weight on the no-announcement states than does Bob, the 
increased NAP  will dominate her welfare change, so Susan’s welfare, i.e., social welfare, 
increases.  
If condition (10) holds, so Susan cares more about the no-announcement states 
than about the announcement states, then the announcement policy improves the asset’s 
ability to share risk. Susan bears less risk since she will get more in the no-announcement 
states which she weighs more, and get less in the announcement states which she weighs 
less. Thus, her welfare, and so the social welfare, increases as a result of the 
announcement policy. Similarly, if Condition (10) is violated, then the announcement 
interferes with the asset’s ability to share risk, as in Hirshleifer (1971). 
Proposition 1 shows the effect of the bubble policy in the case where a semi-bubble 
exists both with and without the announcement policy. We now look at the two 
“information leakage” cases, where the central bank’s announcement causes additional 
information leakage, which bursts the asset semi-bubble. We first look at Case 2b. 
Proposition 2: In Case 2b (where trade happens after the announcement if Susan is 
good), the announcement policy increases social welfare if and only if  
1 2
1 2
( )B a az z z
n nz z
α+ +
+ >
1 2
1 2
( )B a a
n n
y y y
y y
+α +
+ ,                                            (15) 
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where α = ( . Here α is positive but less than one, because we assume ') /NAP A NAPP P P−
'AP ≤ NAPP ≤ NAP  
Proof: Because Bob only buys from good Ellen in Case 2b, and his welfare is 
unaffected by the anti-bubble policy, his welfare gain in the announcement states (paying 
less) should be equal to his welfare loss in the no-announcement states (paying more), i.e.,  
NAPP Bz + ( 'NAP AP P− )( 1 2az z a+ ) = ( NA NAP 1 2n nz zP P− )( + ).                      (16) 
This can also be verified by plugging in the formulas for NAPP = , BIsp NAP = 1
B
NAsp , and 
AP = 2 1 210 /( )a a az z z+ . For Susan, her welfare decreases in the announcement states 
(receiving less) and increases in the no-announcement states (receiving more). When her 
loss is smaller than her gain, then her welfare (social welfare) increases. This happens 
when 
NAPP By +  ( 'NAP AP P− )( 1a 2ay y+ ) < ( NA NAPP P− )( 1 2n ny y+ ).                   (17) 
Dividing Equation (16) by NAPP  gives 
Bz + ( 'NAP A
NAP
P P
P
− )( 1 2az z a+ ) = ( NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− )( 1 2n nz z+ ), 
or 
Bz + α ( 1 2az z a+ ) = ( NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− )( 1 2nz z n+ ),                           (18) 
where α = ( . Similarly, (17) is equivalent to: ') /NAP A NAPP P P−
By +  α ( 1a 2ay y+ ) < ( NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− )( 1n 2ny y+ ).                      (19) 
Rearranging equation (18) and inequality (19) slightly gives:  
NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− = 1 2
1 2
(B a
n n
)az z z
z z
α+ +
+ ,                                     (20) 
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NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− > 1 2
1 2
(B a
n n
y y y
y y
)aα+ +
+ .                                     (21) 
Combining equation (20) and inequality (21) gives Condition (15). QED 
The intuition behind Condition (15) is similar to that in Condition (10). A 
difference is that both agents’ marginal utilities are weighted by an endogenous factor α . 
The factor α  may be understood as follows. 
In Case 2b the central bank announcement reduces Bob’s shadow price. If 
information leakage between Susan and Bob informs Bob that Susan is good, then this 
gives Bob more confidence and raises the price he is willing to pay, so his shadow price 
'AP  rises back up and becomes the market price, i.e., 'AP  rises above Susan’s shadow 
price and gets closer to NAPP . We can view α  as a measure of the information leakage 
effect, that is, when α  approaches zero, the leakage effect is more prominent.  
In the condition, when α  approaches zero, i.e., the leakage effect is very significant, 
then  
1 2
1 2
( )B a az z z
n nz z
α+ +
+ ≈ 1 2
B
n n
z
z z+  and 
1 2
1 2
( )B a a
n n
y y y
y y
+
+ ≈ 1 2
B
n n
y
y y+ ,                 (22) 
+α
so Condition (15) becomes  
1 2 1 2
B
n n n
z y
z z y y
>+ +
B
n
.                                                     (23) 
This means that, when Susan puts less weight than Bob does on the bubble state relative 
to the no-announcement states, social welfare increases.  
We can therefore interpret the information leakage effect as follows. With a 
significant information leakage effect, holding everything else the same, α tends to be a 
small value, i.e., 'AP  is close to NAPP . This implies that the central bank’s bubble-
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bursting announcement has less net impact on the asset price in announcement states   
and , so the negative effect of the announcement only reduces 
1
G
ae
2
G
ae NAPP  slightly to 'AP . 
Thus, since NAPP ≈ , Susan’s welfare changes very little in states   and , so the 
change in social welfare is decided by the trade-off between Susan’s welfare loss in state 
 and her welfare gain in states  and , as in (23). If Susan cares relatively less 
about the bubble state than Bob, as in (23), then welfare is improved by bubble bursting, 
as one would expect. 
'AP 1
G
ae 2
G
ae
Be 1
G
ne 2
G
ne
We now develop the condition in the Case 2a where anti-bubble announcements 
eliminate trade entirely. Bob only buys when the central bank makes no announcement.  
Proposition 3: In Case 2a (where trades only happen when the central bank makes 
no announcement), the announcement policy increases social welfare if and only if  
1 2 1
1 2 1 2
B a a B a
n n n n
z z z y y y
z z y y
2aβ β+ − ⋅ + − ⋅>+ + ,                              (24) 
where (10 ) /NAP NAPP Pβ = − . Here, β is positive since NAPP  is smaller than 10, the 
maximum possible dividend.  
Proof: Because in Case 2a, Bob only buys when the central bank makes no 
announcement, and his welfare is unaffected by the anti-bubble policy, his welfare gain 
in the announcement states (paying less) should be equal to his welfare loss in the no-
announcement states (paying more). Also he suffers utility loss for not getting dividend in 
state . This all gives  2
G
ae
NAPP ( ) = (1 2B az z z+ + a NA NAP 1 2n nz zP P− )( + )+ .                   (25) 210 az
For Susan, her welfare decreases in the announcement states (receiving less) and 
increases in the no-announcement states (receiving more), and she also gains utility in 
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state from getting the dividend. When her loss is smaller than her gain, her welfare 
(social welfare) increases, so 
2
G
ae
NAPP ( 1B a 2ay y y+ + ) < ( NA NAPP P− )( 1 2n ny y+ )+10 .                (26) 2ay
Equation (25) is equivalent to: 
 ( ) +1B az z+ 2( 10)NAP a
NAP
P z
P
−  = ( )NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− ( 1 2n nz z+ ).                   (27) 
Inequality (26) is equivalent to:  
 ( 1B ay y+ ) + ( 10)NAP
NAP
P
P
−
2ay  < ( )NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
− ( 1 2n ny y+ ).                (28) 
Rearranging equation (27) and inequality (28) gives  
( )NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
−  = 1
1 2
B a
n n
2az z z
z z
β+ −
+ ,                                 (29) 
( )NA NAP
NAP
P P
P
−  > 1
1 2
B a
n n
y y y
y y
2aβ+ −
+ ,                                (30) 
where (10 ) /NAP NAPP Pβ = − . Combining equation (29) and inequality (30) yields 
Condition (24). QED 
The intuition behind the condition for Proposition 3 is the same as that in 
Propositions 1 or 2. A difference is that both agents’ marginal utilities are weighted by an 
endogenous and negative factor β.  
The condition can be rewritten as: 
1 2 2
1 2
( ) 1
( )(
NAP B a a a
NA NAP n n
P z z z z
P P z z
+ + −
− +
0
)
> 1 2 2
1 2
( ) 10
( )( )
NAP B a a a
NA NAP n n
P y y y y
P P y y
+ + −
− +
)
.            (31) 
On the left hand side of the condition, 1 2(NAP B a aP z z z+ +  is Bob’s welfare gain from 
paying nothing to Susan, but because trade does not happen in state , Bob suffers a 
loss of  units of utility from the lost dividend. Also
2
G
ae
210 az 1 2( )(NA NAP n nP P z z )− +  is Bob’s 
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welfare loss from paying more to Susan in the announcement states,  We know Bob’s 
welfare loss is compensated by his gain, so the left hand side of inequality (28) is one.  
On the right hand side of the condition, unlike Bob, the numerator is Susan’s net 
welfare loss and the denominator is her net gain, since she is the seller. The condition 
suggests that if Susan puts more weights on the no-announcement states relative to the 
announcement states than Bob does, then her expected welfare gain will be larger than 
her expected loss, and social welfare increases.  
 
 
5    Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a revised Allen et al. (1993) type of greater fool bubble 
framework to evaluate the effect of anti-bubble policy. Unlike most other bubble models, 
this framework includes rational agents and a finite horizon, which rules out infinite-
horizon bubbles as in Tirole (1985). An endogenously generated asset bubble in our 
model provides us with insights about the development and bursting of an asset bubble. 
In this framework, it is not necessary to assume that the central bank is smarter than other 
agents. As long as the central bank’s announcement contains some useful information, we 
show that it is possible, though by no means necessary, that an announcement policy 
benefits the economy.  
Specifically, we show that anti-bubble policy affects an asset’s ability to facilitate 
risk sharing. When sellers care relatively more about the states where the central bank 
makes negative announcement, an announcement policy reduces the asset’s ability to 
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share risks. Conversely, when sellers care relatively more about the no-announcement 
states, the announcement policy improves the asset’s ability to share risks. 
We also identify an information leakage effect initiated by an imperfect anti-bubble 
announcement from the central bank. That is, traders may be able to get additional 
information about the asset by observing price changes after the announcement. Because 
of the leakage effect, more information is revealed to traders than the central bank 
initially possesses. This leakage effect may explain why the effects of anti-bubble policy 
have often been extremely unpredictable during historical bubble episodes.   
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